Uncertain Rule of Certainty: An Analysis and Proposal for a Federal Evidence Rule, The by Martin, Michael M.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1973
Uncertain Rule of Certainty: An Analysis and
Proposal for a Federal Evidence Rule, The
Michael M. Martin
Fordham University School of Law, dean_michael_m_martin@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael M. Martin, Uncertain Rule of Certainty: An Analysis and Proposal for a Federal Evidence Rule, The , 20 Wayne L. Rev. 781
(1973-1974)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/74
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 20 MARCH 1974 NUMBER 3
THE UNCERTAIN RULE OF CERTAINTY: AN
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL
EVIDENCE RULE
MICHAEL M. MARTINt
INTRODUCTION
Two characteristic principles of Anglo-American evidence law are
the requirement that witnesses testify only to their personal observa-
tions (the "first-hand knowledge" rule)' and the prohibition against
witnesses testifying to their inferences (the "opinion" rule).2 How-
ever, a longstanding exception to these principles permits witnesses
possessed of skill or learning to draw inferences, often from facts they
have not personally observed. Because such expert opinion testimony
is exceptional, it is hedged about with various restrictions in addition
to those such as relevancy which apply to all testimony. The predicate
for admission of expert opinion testimony generally consists of two
elements. First, the subject matter should be appropriate for expert
opinion; i.e., it should involve questions beyond the ordinary experi-
t Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1964, J.D. 1966, Univer-
sity of Iowa; B. Litt. 1968, Oxford University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assis-
tance of David Yeres, J.D. 1973, Fordham University, in the preparation of this Article.-ED.
1. See PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 602. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 10 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 650-55
(3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIrMORE].
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Advisory Committee's Notes thereto will hereinafter
be cited to the pamphlet edition of the Rules approved by the Supreme Court on November
20, 1972, and scheduled to be effective July I, 1973. These Rules were also published in 56
F.R.D. 183 (1972). Public Law 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, approved March 30, 1973, provided that the
Rules should "have no force or effect except to the extent, and with such amendments, as they
may be expressly approved by Act of Congress." The House Judiciary Committee reported out
its version of the Rules, H.R. 5463, on November 15, 1973. The Committee's revision includes
no changes of significance to this Article.
2. See generally MCCORMICK § 11; 7 WIGMORE §§ 1917-18. Wigmore cites the opinion
rule, along with the character rule and the hearsay rule (a corollary to the personal knowledge
rule; see 2 id. § 657), as the rules most peculiar to Anglo-American evidence law. See 7
id. § 1929, at 26.
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ence and knowledge of the jurors, so that expert inferences would
assist the jury. Second, the expert witness must be qualified by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education to draw the inferences
which will assist the jury.' Unless at least these two criteria are met,
expert testimony will not be admissible in any jurisdiction.
Where an expert is asked to give an opinion on causation or
prognosis, a number of jurisdictions add the further condition that the
opinion be stated with some degree of certainty. This rule, which in
practice has its most frequent application to expert medical witnesses,
is the subject of the present Article. As used herein, the term "rule
of certainty" refers to a rule which conditions the admissibility of
expert opinion testimony upon the testimony's explicitly or implicitly
satisfying a given standard of certainty.5 Under such a rule the opin-
ion may not be considered by the trier of fact unless the expert is
willing to express the requisite degree of confidence in it. The stan-
dard applied varies widely among the states. For this reason, and
because the question can frequently appear in federal court litiga-
tion,' the rule of certainty would seem to be an appropriate concern
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, although it has not yet
been included in any of the drafts promulgated. 7 This Article will first
survey the rule in its various forms, then analyze it with a view to
3. See, e.g., PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 702; MCCORMICK § 13.
4. See, e.g., PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 702; 2 WIGMORE §§ 555-63.
5. The term has also been used in connection with standards for sufficiency of proof. See,
e.g.. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 25.3 (1956); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
DAMAGES §§ 25-26 (1935). As will be noted infra, the confusion thus engendered or illustrated
between admissibility and sufficiency is a characteristic of the area.
6. See, e.g., Norland v. Washington Gen. Hosp., 461 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1972) (medical
malpractice); Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1970) (Dram Shop Act auto
accident personal injury action); Sheptur v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 261 F.2d 221 (6th
Cir. 1958) (products liability); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Landes, 252 F.2d 751 (5th Cir.
1958) (workmen's compensation); Hill v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 174 F.2d 171
(3d Cir. 1949) (passenger personal injury); Armit v. Loveland, 115 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1940)
(Jones Act negligence); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1939)
(double indemnity life insurance); Neff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1947),
affd, 173 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1949) (Federal Employers Liability Act).
7. See COMMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES (Prelim. Draft 1969), also in 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969); id. (Rev. Draft 1971),
also in 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). Although it has been discussed in the leading evidence treatise,
see 2 WIGMORE § 663; 7 id. § 1976, the rule has not been covered in any of the major evidence
codifications proposed or adopted. See, e.g.. CAL. EVID. CODE (West 1966); MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE (1942); NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE (1953).
[V/ol. 20
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suggesting a reformed federal rule, and, finally, consider the Erie
problems involved in adopting the proposal as a federal rule of evi-
dence.
I. SURVEY OF THE STANDARDS APPLIED
There are many formulas used as standards in judging the cer-
tainty of expert opinion testimony. In some jurisdictions the expert
may say that a given outcome "might have,"' "could have,"' or"possibly"'" resulted from the stated facts. For example, in Yellow
Cab Co. v. McCullers," the plaintiffs expert witness was asked
whether plaintiff's injury "could be" of traumatic origin. An objec-
tion on the grounds that the evidence was speculative and not definite
enough was overruled and he answered that" '[i]t could be. . ' "12
The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that no error was committed,
since if the doctor was unwilling to give a more definite opinion on
direct examination, there was no logical reason why the answer
should be inadmissible. To require more might have elicited testi-
mony not in fact representing the doctor's opinion.1 3 However, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Garrett v. Wade,4 ruled that it was
error to admit a deposition by the plaintiff's expert which included
the statement, "It is my opinion that at least part of this loss of
8. See, e.g., Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714, 134 A. 259, 261
(1926); York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Ford v. Blythe Bros., 242
N.C. 347, 357, 87 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1955); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 646,
648, 153 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1944); Henderson v. Union Pac. R.R., 189 Ore. 145, 160, 219 P.2d
170, 177 (1950).
9. See, e.g., Herman v. Ferrell, 276 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); DeMoulin v.
Kissir, 446 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Leavitt v. Bacon, 89 N.H. 383, 393, 200 A.
399, 405 (1938); White v. Standard Oil Co., 116 Ohio App. 212, 221, 187 N.E.2d 504, 510
(1962); Combustion Eng'r Co. v. Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 238, 357 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1962);
Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W. Va. 681, 692, 97 S.E.2d 803, 809-
10 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Bogard GMC Co. v. Henley, 2 Ariz. App. 223, 225, 407 P.2d 412,414 (1965);
Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa 1970); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 315,
109 N.W.2d 828, 829 (1961) (admissible, but limiting instruction should be given); Lenger v.
Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. 1970); Gibson v. Avery, 463 S.W.2d
277, 279-80 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1970); White v. Maverick Prod. Co., 63 Wyo. 452, 464, 182
P.2d 818, 823 (1947). But see, e.g., Gribben v. Fox, 130 N.J.L. 357, 359, 32 A.2d 853, 854 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
i. 98 Ga. App. 601, 106 S.E.2d 535 (1958).
12. Id. at 609, 106 S.E.2d at 542.
13. Id. at 610, 106 S.E.2d at 542.
14. 259 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1972).
1974]
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hearing in the left ear, which I think is now permanent, might be
attributed to acoustic trauma which can be a loud noise or can be a
blunt blow to the ear or the side of the head."' The court said that
medical testimony is not probative unless it is given in terms of
probabilities, and not mere possibilities.'" A third formula is repre-
sented by Fruen v. Brenner,17 in which the Wisconsin supreme court
ruled it was error to admit testimony that the plaintiff's accident"could have produced a hearing loss" because the opinion was not"a statement to a medical certainty. 18 Finally, a few courts require
the expert to testify in positive and explicit terms when giving an
opinion on causation. Thus, the Minnesota supreme court ruled in
Saaf v. Duluth Police Pension Relief Association9 that if medical
testimony is required on the question, the expert must testify not only
that the injury might have caused death, but also that it did cause
15. Id. 478-79.
16. Id. 479.
17. 16 Wis. 2d 445, 114 N.W.2d 782 (1962).
18. Id. at 453, 114 N.W.2d at 786. The error was held not prejudicial in view of other proper
testimony by the expert on the same point. Id. at 453, 114 N.W.2d at 786-87. The Wisconsin
supreme court subsequently decided that "reasonable medical probability" more accurately
expressed the standard to be applied, since medicine "is not based on such certitude but rather
upon the empirical knowledge and experience in the area of cause and effect." Pucci v. Rausch,
51 Wis. 2d 513, 518-19, 187 N.W.2d 138, 141 (1971).
"Certainty" or "reasonable certainty" is rarely required in opinions on causation. But see
Macal v. Chicago Tumor Inst., 9 Il. App. 2d 389, 132 N.E.2d 809 (1956) (only abstract
published); Whittington v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 177 Neb. 264, 286, 128 N.W.2d 795,
808 (1964); cf. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 111. App. 2d 109, 131, 253 N.E.2d 636, 646 (1969),
affd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970). The standard is more frequently applied to opinions
involving prognosis. See, e.g., Redmon v. Sooter, 1 111. App. 3d 406, 412, 274 N.E.2d 200, 204
(1971); Strohm v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 96 N.Y. 305,306-07 (1884); Vaux v. Hamilton,
103 N.W.2d 291, 295 (N.D. 1960); Williams v. Daniels, 48 Tenn. App. 112, 344 S.W.2d 555,
560 (1960).
The rule in Texas has been liberalized since 1965 to permit "possibility" opinions regarding
both cause and prognosis. See generally Musslewhite, Medical Causation Testimony in Texas:
Possibility versus Probability, 23 Sw. L.J. 622, 631-43 (1969). However, the "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" standard has been retained for opinions contained in medical records introduced
pursuant to TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 3737e (Supp. 1972) (business records exception to the
hearsay rule); cf. Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966), noted in 19 BAYLOR L.
REV. 122 (1967). The Loper case involved second-hand hearsay (i.e., doctor making record
included opinion of other doctor), so the court may have been especially concerned with the
absence in the circumstances of an opportunity to cross-examine on the opinion. See id. How-
ever, the court gave no indication the same standard would not be applied to opinions of the
recording doctor. That result is not unreasonable, since it is the opportunity to develop the
testimony by cross-examinatiort which justifies admission of "possibility" opinions to prove
questions decided on the probabilities. See text at notes 136-40 infra.
19. 240 Minn. 60, 59 N.W.2d 883 (1953).
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death.20
The foregoing standards of "possibility," "probability," "medical
certainty," and "did" are only illustrative; in numerous other cases
the courts permit or require opinions in such terms as "most proba-
ble,"2 "definite possibility, ' 22 "most likely, '2 3 "reasonable probabil-
ity,"24 and "more likely than not."' ' Rather than attempting to de-
tail the rule or rules applied in each state,26 the discussion will now
20. Id. at 65, 59 N.W.2d at 886. The court noted that the expert need not express absolute
certainty in his opinion, nor need he couch it in particular words. Id.; accord, Sullivan v.
Hagstrom Constr. Co., 244 Minn. 271, 278, 69 N.W.2d 805, 809-10 (1955).
21. See, e.g., American Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 216 Ark. 44, 46, 223 S.W.2d 1019, 1020-
21 (1949); Martin v. Mobley, 253 S.C. 103, 108, 169 S.E.2d 278, 281 (1969); Gambrell v.
Burleson, 252 S.C. 98, 101, 165 S.E.2d 622, 623 (1969).
22. See Johnson v. Wilson, 97 So. 2d 674, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1957), rev'd on other grounds,
239 La. 390, 118 So. 2d 450 (1960).
23. See Weller v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 239 Minn. 298, 303, 58 N.W.2d 739, 742 (1953)
(sufficiency case).
24. See, e.g.. Young v. L.A. Davidson, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ky. 1971) (sufficiency
case); Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 324, 139 S.E.2d 753, 759 (1965); Lockwood v.
McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 668-69, 138 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1964); cf. Ephrem v. Phillips, 99 So.
2d 257, 261 (Fla. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1958).
25. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 444, 481 P.2d 924, 927
(1971).
A similar variety in permissible expression is apparent in decisions involving prognosis
opinions. See, e.g., Saslow v. Rexford, 395 P.2d 36, 41-42 (Alas. 1964) ("possibilities" admissi-
ble); Southwestern Freight Lines, Ltd. v. Floyd, 58 Ariz. 249, 264, 119 P.2d 120, 127 (1941)
("effects that might happen" admitted); Reed v. McGibboney, 243 Ark. 789, 793, 422 S.W.2d
115, 118 (1967) ("might" and "possibility" admitted); Central Truckaway Sys., Inc. v. Harri-
gan, 79 Ga. App. 117, 127, 53 S.E.2d 186, 192 (1949) ("likely" admitted); Melford v. Gaus &
Brown Constr. Co., 17 II1. App. 2d 497, 505, 151 N.E.2d 128, 131-32 (1958) ("good chance"
admitted); Cerra v. McClanahan, 141 Ind. App. 469, 473-74, 229 N.E.2d 737, 739-40 (1967)
("might" and "could" affect only weight, not admissibility); Fort Wayne Transit, Inc. v.
Shomo, 127 Ind. App. 542, 551-52, 143 N.E.2d 431, 437 (1957) (probability testimony admit-
ted); Ernshaw v. Roberge, 86 N.H. 451, 453-54, 170 A. 7, 8 (1934) ("might" inadmissible to
prove probabilities); Paduchik v. Mikoff, 112 N.E.2d 69, 76 (Ohio Com. PI. 1951), affd, 158
Ohio St. 533, 110 N.E.2d 562 (1953) ("apt to" admitted); Koenig v. Weber, 84 S.D. 558, 569,
174 N.W.2d 218, 224 (1970) ("medical certainty or medical probability" required); Rocky Mt.
Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 479, 335 P.2d 448, 453 (1959) (expert's belief is not a
statement of mere possibility unless he so qualifies it, nor is it to be taken as conjecture). See
also People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 209 n.2, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 602 n.2 (1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970) (expert may give opinion to "reasonable medical certainty" rather
than "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal case); State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d 81, 85-86,
246 N.E.2d 365, 367-68 (1969), noted in 59 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1024-25 (1971) ("likely" does
not meet "reasonable certainty" required in criminal case).
26. A state-by-state digest of decisions is included in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.,
THE RULE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY (1967). Individual state rules are discussed in W. KING &
D. PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE LAW OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 71-92 (1942)
[hereinafter KING & PILLINGER]; Arnold, Medical Evidence in Wisconsin, 49 MARQ. L. REV.
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focus on New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. Development of the
rule of certainty in these states has involved substantial litigation and
the resulting opinions suggest the principal theoretical bases for the
rule.
II. THE RATIONALES DEVELOPED
A. New York-A void Speculation
The New York rule of certainty was first stated in Strohm v. New
York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad CoY in 1884. The plaintiffs
minor son had suffered severe head injuries, allegedly because of the
defendant's negligence. The court of appeals reversed a judgment for
the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's expert witness had
erroneously been permitted to opine, "A patient sustaining such inju-
ries and presenting such premonitory signs, may develop traumatic
insanity, or meningitis, or progressive dementia, or epilepsy with its
results. '2 8 Such evidence was too speculative, especially when the
expert could not decide which of those diseases the boy presently had
and could state in regard to the permanency of the boy's condition
only that "I mean that the boy will always have some remnants of
this injury, some reminder of it, great or small, that is certain; how
much he will retain I cannot tell, but I think it very likely he will
retain. '29 The court held that admission of such uncertain and specu-
lative evidence would permit the jury to violate the principle that
damages for future consequences must be based on "such a degree
of probability of their occurring, as amounts to a reasonable certainty
that they will result from the original injury.""0
The Strohm case illustrates three points which recur frequently in
this area. First, the court was concerned with the problem of specula-
tion. Since the expert is not limited to testimony of his personal
657, 669 (1966); Bernstein, How Certain Must the Expert Be?, 18 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 186 (1947);
Holz, Survey of Rules Governing Medical Proof in Wisconsin-1970, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 989;
Jordan, Expert Testimony-Cause of Present Physical Condition, 29 TEXAS B.J. 805 (1966);
Musslewhite, supra note 18; Weinberg, New York Law on the Admissibility of Medical Opin-
ions on Causal and Prognostic Relationships Between Accident and Injury: The Case Law and
a Proposal for Reform, 8 TRIAL LAWS. Q. 32 (1971); Note, Admissibility of Expert Medical
Testimony in Pennsylvania-The Semantic Trap, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 150 (1969).
27. 96 N.Y. 305 (1884).
28. Id. 307.
29. Id. 306-07.
30. Id. 306.
[Vol. 20
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observations, safeguards are deemed necessary to ensure that the
exception for expert opinion testimony does not become a license to
lead the jury away from "the facts." Second, this court (in common
with many others) looked to the expert's use of particular verbal
formulations in determining whether the opinion was speculative.
Thus, the expert's use of phrases like "may develop" and "very
likely" was noted by the court as indicating that the opinion did not
meet the requisite "reasonable certainty. ' 31 Finally, the court did not
distinguish the issue being appealed from other issues in the case. The
issue being appealed was the admissibility of the evidence, but the
court's discussion of that question included reference to both specula-
tion and the burden of persuasion for proving future damages. The
former factor is unquestionably important to the admissibility ques-
tion; the latter might well be considered an entirely separate issue.
Nevertheless, the court's citation only of burden-of-persuasion 31
cases as precedents when deciding the admissibility issue is not atypi-
cal.33
The Strohm rule of "reasonable certainty" was distinguished 4
years later in Turner v. City of Newburgh.3 4 The plaintiff in that case
sued the city for injuries suffered when she fell over a loose stone in
a crosswalk. Her expert medical witnesses testified over objection
that her physical condition "could have resulted from a fall. 35 The
court of appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, saying that the
Strohm rule "simply precludes the giving of evidence of future conse-
quences which are contingent, speculative and merely possible, as the
basis of ascertaining damages." 6 The rule applicable in Turner per-
mitted "the expression of opinions by competent medical experts
upon an ascertained physical condition of suffering or bad health, as
to whether that condition might have been caused by or the result of
a previous injury."" Turner thus reasserted the notion that the rule
31. See id. 306. See also, e.g., Garrett v. Wade, 259 So. 2d 476, 478-79 (Miss. 1972);
Gribben v. Fox, 130 N.J.L. 357, 359, 32 A.2d 853, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
32. See 96 N.Y. at 306, citing Curtis v. Rochester & S.R.R., 18 N.Y. 534 (1859); Filer v.
New York Cent. R.R., 49 N.Y. 42 (1872); Clark v. Brown, 18 Wend. 213 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837);
Lincoln v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 23 Wend. 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
33. See, e.g., Haase v. Ryan, 100 Ohio App. 285, 288-89, 136 N.E.2d 406, 409-10 (1955);
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Powers, 101 Tex. 161, 164-65, 105 S.W. 491, 492 (1907).
34. 109 N.Y. 301, 16 N.E. 344 (1888).
35. Id. at 308, 16 N.E. at 346.
36. Id. at 309, 16 N.E. at 347.
37. Id. at 308, 16 N.E. at 346.
1974]
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of certainty operates to prevent introduction of speculation, and also
distinguished, in the need for such protection, between opinions re-
garding future unascertained consequences and those dealing with the
causes of conditions already observed. 38
Turner distinguished causation opinions from those regarding
latent consequences; the following year the court made a further
category for opinions on the prognosis for present conditions. In the
negligence case of Griswold v. New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad," the plaintiff had asked her medical witnesses as to "the
probability of her recovery."4 The defendant objected on the ground
that Strohm required opinions of future consequences to be stated
with reasonable certainty. In affirming the admissibility of the testi-
mony and a judgment for the plaintiff, the court of appeals distin-
guished the situations and again indicated the importance of the spec-
ulation factor in its thinking:
There is an obvious difference between an opinion as to the perman-
ence of a disease or injury already existing, capable of being exam-
ined and studied, and one as to the merely possible outbreak of new
diseases or sufferings having their cause in the original injury. In the
former case that disease or injury and its symptoms are present and
existing, their indications are more or less plain and obvious, and
from their severity or slightness a recovery may be expected or the
contrary; while an opinion that some new and different complication
will arise is merely a double speculation-one that it may possibly
occur, and the other that if it does it will be a product of the original
injury instead of some other new and, perhaps, unknown cause.41
The principal question remaining after Griswold was what stan-
dard of certainty applied to prognosis opinions. The court had clearly
stated that even though both situations involved looking into the
future, the Strohm rule was inapplicable. Whether Turner's "possibil-
ity" would be acceptable has not been clearly decided to this day.
Turner contains language suggesting that cause and duration are to
be treated alike,42 but it was dictum in the context of that case.
38. See also Stephens v. Guffey, 409 S.W.2d 62, 69-70 (Mo. 1966); text at notes 65-66 infra.
39. 115 N.Y. 61, 21 N.E. 726 (1889).
40. Id. at 63, 21 N.E. at 726.
41. Id. at 64, 21 N.E. at 726.
42.
Those authorities [Strohm v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 96 N.Y. 305 (1884);
Tozer v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 105 N.Y. 617, It N.E. 369 (1887) (mem.)] in
nowise conflict with the rule allowing evidence of physicians as to a plaintiff's present
[Vol. 20
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Griswold cannot be considered authoritative on the point, since only"probability" and not "possibility" testimony had been offered.
However, the court spoke solely in terms of "reasonable probability"
and did not rely upon the Turner dictum to buttress its decision.43
No subsequent appellate case has had to deal with a prognosis opin-
ion stated in possibility terms, although several have upheld the ad-
mission of testimony that present injuries "probably" will have stated
effects or are "likely" to be of a given duration with statements of
the applicable rule in probability or likelihood rather than possibility
terms.44 However, a recent trial court decision, relying on the Turner
dictum, admitted evidence that the plaintiff's whiplash injuries "could
be" permanent.4 5
The scheme thus established in the 1880's has been subjected to
only minor refinements by the subsequent cases. The first develop-
ment has been to make clear that speculative testimony will not be
permitted even under the relatively loose "could or might" standard
applied to causation opinions. For example, in Drollette v. Kelly,4"
where the defendant's expert testified that the plaintiff's injuries"could have" resulted from the second of two accidents in which she
was involved, the Third Department held the testimony erroneously
admitted because there was no evidence the plaintiff had in fact suf-
fered any injuries in the second accident. Even though the plaintiff
exhibited some injuries in court, the expert's testimony was only
speculative on the dispositive issue of the particular accident in which
they were incurred.4 7 Similarly, the court of appeals reversed a work-
men's compensation award in Miller v. National Cabinet Co.4" after
the claimant's expert had testified generally to the high incidence of
leukemia in persons exposed to benzol and the possibility that the
claimant might have so contracted the disease, but without specifi-
cally attributing this claimant's disease to that cause. The court
condition of bodily suffering or injuries, of their permanence and as to their cause.
109 N.Y. at 308, 16 N.E. at 347 (emphasis added).
43. See 115 N.Y. at 64, 21 N.E. at 726.
44. See, e.g., Cross v. City of Syracuse, 200 N.Y. 393,397, 94 N.E. 184, 185 (1911); Knoll
v. Third Ave. R.R., 46 App. Div. 527, 530, 62 N.Y.S. 16, 18 (1900), affd mem., 168 N.Y.
592, 60 N.E. 1113 (1901).
45. Peligri v. Cat Serv. Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 257, 259, 232 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1961).
46. 286 App. Div. 641, 146 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1955).
47. See id. at 643, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 57-58.
48. 8 N.Y.2d 277, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1960).
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warned:
General expressions of opinion in relation to cause and effect are
permitted to a medical witness only where they are directed to show-
ing that the condition of the particular plaintiff or claimant was such
as to indicate that it was occasioned by the injury or injurious expo-
sure claimed. 9
A second refinement apparent in the New York rule of certainty
decisions has been a decreased reliance on semantic formulas. In
effect, the burden has been shifted from the witness' being required
to use the proper words to the court's being required to divine from
the whole opinion the level of certainty which it reflects."
B. Pennsylvania-Sufficiency of the Evidence
Pennsylvania also appears to divide rule of certainty cases accord-
ing to whether they involve opinions regarding causation, prognosis,
or latent consequences. However, because of the different rationale
used for the rule, different standards are applied.
The principal statement of the Pennsylvania rule of certainty
comes from the 1926 case of Vorbnoff v. Mesta Machine Co.51 In
actuality the case involved no admissibility question; the issue was
whether a workmen's compensation award was supported by compe-
tent evidence. 2 In remanding the case to the compensation board for
further fact-finding, the supreme court said that when a claimant
depends on expert medical testimony to show that an accident was
responsible for his disability, the expert "witness would have to tes-
tify, not that the condition of claimant might have, or even probably
did, come from the accident, but that 'in his professional opinion the
49. Id. at 283, 168 N.E.2d at 814, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 133. Compare McGrath v. Irving, 24
App. Div. 2d 236, 238, 265 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1965), where the court reaffirmed the admissibil-
ity of "possibility" testimony in causation opinions, after the plaintiff's doctor had been permit-
ted to testify that in his opinion inhalation of glass particles in an automobile accident had
caused accelerated development or growth of the plaintiff's throat cancer. See also Scherbner
v. Masmil Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 1072, 312 N.Y.S.2d 114 (mem.), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 27 N.Y.2d 487 (1970).50. See, e.g., Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, Inc., 12 N.Y.2d 414,416, 190 N.E.2d 528, 529,
240 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154-55 (1963); Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 282, 168
N.E.2d 811, 813, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132-33 (1960); Falconer v. Proto Tool Co., 19 App. Div.
2d 926, 927, 244 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1963) (mem.).
51. 286 Pa. 199, 133 A. 256 (1926).
52. See id. at 204, 133 A. at 257.
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result in question came from the cause alleged'. . . .53 Relying on
its recent sufficiency decisions," the court reasoned that "a less direct
expression of opinion would fall below the required standard of proof
and therefore would not constitute legally competent evidence. ' 15
The Pennsylvania rule, like New York's, thus grew out of an
initial failure to distinguish between the concepts of admissibility and
sufficiency of evidence. However, avoidance of speculation soon be-
came the dominant rationale in New York, while Pennsylvania con-
tinued to focus on whether the evidence would satisfy standards of
proof. For example, as recently as 1971 the Pennsylvania supreme
court reversed a judgment for a plaintiff who claimed that her ar-
thritic condition was the result of an auto accident caused by the
defendant's negligence." The plaintiffs expert witness had been per-
mitted to testify that the accident was "consistent with that sort of
injury"; "there is probably a cause and effect relationship"; and "my
opinion is there is an arthritis which is consistent with traumatic
arthritis."57 In upholding the defendant's argument that these opin-
ions were inadmissible, the court explained:
The issue is not merely one of semantics. There is a logical reason
for the rule. The opinion of a medical expert is evidence. If the fact
finder chooses to believe it, he can find as fact what the expert gave
as an opinion. For a fact finder to award damages for a particular
condition to a plaintiff it must find as a fact that that condition was
legally caused by the defendant's conduct. Here, the only evidence
offered was that it was "probably" caused, and that is not enough.
Perhaps in the world of medicine nothing is absolutely certain. Nev-
ertheless, doctors must make decisions in their own profession every
day based on their own expert opinions. Physicians must understand
that it is the intent of our law that if the plaintiffs medical expert
cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so as to make a
medical judgment, there is nothing on the record with which a jury
can make a decision with sufficient certainty so as to make a legal
53. Id. at 206, 133 A. at 258.
54. Anderson v. Baxter, 285 Pa. 443, 446-47, 132 A. 358, 359 (1926); McCrosson v. Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit Co., 283 Pa. 492, 495-96, 129 A. 568, 569 (1925).
55. 286 Pa. at 206, 133 A. at 258; accord, Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa.
497, 501, 103 A.2d 681, 684 (1954); Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 24, 46 A.2d 469, 472 (1946);
see Sacks v. J.L. Freed & Sons, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 717, 723, 156 A.2d 187, 191 (1959); cf. Grentz
v. Danny's Restaurant, 187 Pa. Super. 625, 629-30, 145 A.2d 883, 885 (1958).
56. McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534 (1971).
57. Id. at 485, 276 A.2d at 535.
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judgment."
Although that explanation would serve equally to justify reversal
for failure to grant a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., the court
specifically stated that the evidence was "inadmissible" and "not
legally competent,"5 and not just that it was insufficient.
Because it is based on sufficiency standards, the Vorbnoff rule,
requiring a professional opinion that the result came from the cause
alleged, is relaxed when the party has other evidence besides the
expert's opinion. For example, where the plaintiff's expert testified
in an action on an accident insurance policy that tripping on the
sidewalk "can bring about" a hernia, the court noted that expert
medical testimony was not essential because the injury was "naturally
and probably" caused by the alleged accident. In light of that pre-
sumption, the expert's testimony was "competent and sufficient." 6
Regarding opinions as to future consequences, the differing ra-
tionales provide another contrast between the New York and Penn-
sylvania rules. In New York the standard of certainty required rises
as the prognostication factor in the opinion increases, while in Penn-
sylvania the certainty required in at least some causation opinions
may give way to possibility when the opinion involves prognosis. The
principle applied to such cases is also derived from a decision involv-
ing only a sufficiency issue. In Stevenson v. Pennsylvania Sports &
Enterprises, Inc.,6 the plaintiff's expert, when asked about the dura-
tion of the plaintiff's injury, replied, "Possibly it is permanent and
possibly he will get better within a year. I don't have a definite
opinion.""2 The court held the evidence sufficient to support an award
58. Id. at 486, 276 A.2d at 535.
59. Id. at 485, 486, 276 A.2d at 535.
60. Tabuteau v. London Guar. & Ace. Co., 351 Pa. 183, 186, 40 A.2d 396, 398 (1945),
noted in 18 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 186, 188-90 (1947); see Kennedy v. Holmes Constr. Co., 147 Pa.
Super. 348, 354, 24 A.2d 451, 455 (1942) (sufficiency case). But see Hayward v. Diamond, 117
Pitt. L.J. 211 (Allegheny County, Pa., C.P. 1969), noted in 31 U. PrT. L. REv. 150 (1969).
In a recent products liability case, the plaintiffs expert indicated he could not "positively"
state the "actual cause of the fracture of this bottle" because many of the pieces were missing.
The court held his testimony erroneously excluded, saying his inability to give a positive opinion
"is not inconsistent with his ability to form an opinion based on less than certain evidence. A
precise scientist who bases his opinion on an appraisal of probabilities is nonetheless an expert.
In our view his opinion deserves jury consideration." Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430
Pa. 176, 181, 242 A.2d 231, 233 (1968). Compare id. with Smail v. Flock, 407 Pa. 148, 152,
180 A.2d 59, 60-61 (1962), and Woods v. Pleasant Hills Motor Co., 219 Pa. Super. 381, 392,
281 A.2d 649, 654 (1971).
61. 372 Pa. 157, 93 A.2d 236 (1952).
62. Id. at 164, 93 A.2d at 239.
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of damages for future disability, saying:
The problem here involved is one of prognosis on which a doctor
cannot be required to express his opinion with the definiteness re-
quired in a causation question. In many cases of personal injury the
honest opinion of a doctor may well be that a plaintiff will "gradually
improve" or that the injury may "possibly be permanent or may
possibly get better within a year." This uncertainty of honest medical
opinion should not be the basis for any finding by the jury of
permanent injury but is sufficient, on the other hand, for the jury to
find some future disability. 3
This language has since been used to permit the admission of less-
than-certain prognosis opinions. 4 However, in order to be admissible
under this rubric, the opinion must relate to "the possibility of some
future disability ordinarily expectant from the personal injury. ' 6 5
Thus, testimony that infection from occasional leakage of cerebro-
spinal fluid could lead to meningitis and possible death was held
improperly admitted because the relation between the plaintiff's
proved head injury and possible death from meningitis was too re-
mote.66 The court might have had in mind a distinction similar to
New York's between ascertained and latent future consequences, but
if so the point has not been developed thus far in the cases.
C. Illinois-Prevent Invading the Province of the Jurs
The rule of certainty developed in Illinois up to 1960 reveals a
third rationale for such rules: preventing invasion of the province of
the jury. In the leading case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Smith, 7
where there was a dispute as to how the plaintiff's injury occurred,
his medical expert was permitted to answer the questions, "Describe
. . . how the injury must have been made. . . ." and "How, in your
opinion, was the injury inflicted?"6 8 The Illinois supreme court held
that such testimony was erroneously admitted, since it involved a
63. Id. at 165, 93 A.2d at 240.
64. See, e.g., Boyle v. Pennsylvania R.R., 403 Pa. 614, 618, 170 A.2d 865, 867 (1961); cf
Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 505-07, 103 A.2d 681, 685-86 (1954).
65. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 506, 103 A.2d 681, 686 (1954).
66. Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 319-21, 85 A.2d 841, 843-44 (1952). See also Menarde v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 506, 103 A.2d 681, 686 (1954).
67. 208 III. 608, 70 N.E. 628 (1904).
68. Id. at 610, 70 N.E. at 629.
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question of fact properly to be decided by the jury, not the witness. 9
However, earlier cases permitting opinions upon what "might" have
caused the injury were approved. 0 Unlike the New York and Penn-
sylvania cases requiring minimum certainty, the Smith case estab-
lished a rule of maximum certainty permissible.
Three years later the court limited the Smith rule by holding, in
City of Chicago v. Didier,71 that when there was no conflict in the
evidence as to whether the plaintiff was injured in the manner
claimed, it was proper to receive expert opinions on the question
whether certain physical conditions were caused by the complained-
of injury.72 The question arose because the defendant conceded that
its negligence caused the plaintiff to fall and hurt her knee; the ex-
perts' testimony was offered only to prove causation of injuries to the
pelvic region. In spite of the fact that these consequential injuries
were the basis of the principal issue litigated, the court in effect
decided that the cause of a present condition could not be the ultimate
issue when the cause of the original injury was conceded. 73 The point
was further refined in 1916, when the court held that unless there was
no dispute as to both the existence of the original injury claimed and
the manner and cause of that injury, opinions regarding the causation
of a subsequent physical condition could be stated only in "could"
or "might" terms.7 1
If one assumes the reliability of the verbal formulas as indicators
of the experts' confidence in their opinions, it seems apparent that the
Smith rule could encourage speculation by permitting opinions with
no significant probability basis. 75 The classic example of this pheno-
menon is the case in which the plaintiff in his first trial alleged injuries
to his hip and ankle, but was permitted to offer testimony at a second
trial that the accident "might" also have caused an inguinal hernia
and a detached retina.71
69. Id. at 611-12, 70 N.E. at 629.
70. Id. at 617-18, 70 N.E. at 631, citing Shorb v. Webber, 188 I11. 126, 58 N.E. 949 (1900);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Treat, 179 I11. 576, 54 N.E. 290 (1899); Village of Chatsworth v. Rowe,
166 II1. 114, 46 N.E. 763 (1897); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Latimer, 128 II. 163, 21 N.E. 7 (1889).
71. 227 Ill. 571, 81 N.E. 698 (1907).
72. Id. at 575, 81 N.E. at 700.
73. See id. at 572-74, 81 N.E. at 699-700.
74. Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry., 272 I11. 71, 111 N.E. 499 (1916).
75. See KING & PILLINGER, supra note 26, at 83.
76. See West Chicago St. Ry. v. Dougherty, 209 Ill. 241, 70 N.E. 586 (1904). King and
Pillinger's discussion of this case erroneously suggests that the hernia and eye injuries were first
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The trust and confidence reposed in the jury by the Illinois court's
fear of invading its province stands in sharp contrast to the New York
and Pennsylvania view designed to prevent speculation and verdicts
on insufficient evidence. However, in the area of prognosis opinions
Illinois went along with its sister states. A doctor who was not permit-
ted to say that in his opinion the defendant's acts "did" cause the
plaintiff's injuries was permitted to say nothing less certain when
asked about anticipated consequences. 77 In the leading case of Lauth
v. Chicago Union Traction Co.,7" a judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed for erroneous admission of testimony that "any hernia may
become strangulated at any time" and if it is not reduced "death will
ensue." The court stated:
In this class of cases, in estimating the pecuniary loss, all the
consequences of the injury, future as well as past, which are shown
by the evidence to be reasonably certain to result from the injury, are
to be taken into consideration. . . .To form a proper basis for
recovery, however, it is necessary that the consequences relied on
must be reasonably certain to result. They cannot be purely specula-
tive.
...There is not such a degree of probability that death will
result from this injury as amounts to a reasonable certainty, and it
was error to admit this testimony.79
Recent Illinois decisions have modified the certainty rules applied
to both causation and prognosis opinions. The literal-formula ap-
proach of Smith and Didier was overruled in 1960 in Clifford-Jacobs
Forging Co. v. Industrial Commission.0 The court upheld the admis-
sion of "did cause" answers to hypothetical questions, saying, "So
long as the witness is not called upon to decide any controverted fact,
mentioned at the third trial, rather than at the second. Compare id. at 243, 70 N.E. at 587,
with KING & PILLINGER 83.
77. Wigmore cites this as
one of the many instances in which the subtle mental twistings produced by the
Opinion rule have reduced this part of the law to a congeries of non-sense which is
comparable to the incantations of medieval sorcerers and sullies the name of Reason
in our law.
7 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1976, at 122.
78. 244 III. 244, 91 N.E. 431 (1910).
79. Id. at 251-53, 91 N.E. at 434-35 (citations omitted). The court cited with approval, inter
alia, Strohm v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 96 N.Y. 305 (1884), discussed at notes 27-32supra.
The Lauth decision is criticized for the rule of substantive law it established in KING &
PILLINGER 91-92.
80. 19 III. 2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960).
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but is asked to assume the truth of facts testified to, he may give his
opinion thereon in any form."81 This meant that the "ultimate facts"
rule was being retained (although its inapplicability to hypothetical
questions was finally recognized), 2 but its corollary for half a cen-
tury, the rule requiring uncertainty in stating opinions, was finally
abolished.
The rule requiring reasonable certainty in prognosis opinions has
been modified by the increasing willingness of the courts to make
judgments on certainty without requiring that the witnesses adhere to
verbal formulas. Thus, when an expert testified that the "present
limitation of motion in the [plaintiffs] knee could become a perma-
nent condition" and that the plaintiff "could continue to have pain
and suffering from the condition of the injuries," but that it "was
hard to say how long this [disability] would continue,"'' the appel-
late court held there was no error in admitting the testimony because
it appeared the expert had based his opinion on a "reasonable degree
of medical certainty," even though he was unfamiliar with legal
phraseology.84
There may also be some modification of the reasonable certainty
rule implicit in this recent explanation of the term:
When a Doctor is asked to base his opinion on a reasonable degree
of medical certainty the certainty referred to is not that some condi-
tion in the future is certain to exist or not to exist. Rather the reason-
able certainty refers to the general consensus of recognized medical
thought and opinion concerning the probabilities of conditions in the
future based on present conditions. 5
In this case the doctor was permitted to testify "to a reasonable
degree of medical and surgical certainty" that the plaintiff's injured
eye had a "fifty per cent chance of being removed in the next ten
years. '88 Even though the doctor conceded there was an element of
speculation and conjecture in his answer, admission of the testimony
was upheld because it was based on reasonable certainty as defined
above and because it included a description of the medical basis for
81. Id. at 243, 166 N.E.2d at 587.
82. See E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE §§ 11.3, .11 (2d ed. 1963).
83. Redmon v. Sooter, 1 111. App. 3d 406, 409-10, 274 N.E.2d 200, 202 (1971).
84. Id. at 412, 274 N.E.2d at 204.
85. Boose v. Digate, 107 11. App. 2d 418, 423, 246 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1969); see Redmon v.
Sooter, I Ill. App. 3d 406, 412, 274 N.E.2d 200, 204 (1971).
86. 107 11. App. 2d at 421, 246 N.E.2d at 52.
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the opinion, assuring that it was not founded on guess or surmise.87
III. THE RATIONALES ANALYZED
A. Preventing Invasion of the Province of the Jury
Of the rationales suggested for rules of certainty, the fear of
invading the province of the jury is, as the Illinois courts have come
to realize,81 probably the least justifiable. Dean Wigmore long ago
pointed out that the fear is nonsensical, since the witness could not
make the jury accept his opinions even if he wanted to; as finders of
fact they are free to reject any or all testimony presented, and no
court would instruct them otherwise." If the rationale can in any way
be'satisfactorily explained, it is upon an assumption that the jury will
adopt the expert's opinion without question unless he limits it by
conditional words. That assumption may have had some validity
when expert testimony was admissible only in regard to matters be-
yond common knowledge and experience; 0 in such circumstances the
jury had almost, by definition, to accept the expert's word. However,
the emphasis nowadays is on the assistance expert testimony can
provide to the trier of facts, rather than the necessity for it. 1 This
undercuts the "ultimate issue" prohibition in many cases; in the rest,
the problem of giving excessive weight to the expert's opinion can be
far more easily avoided by guiding the jury through instructions than
by attempting the impossible task of defining the "ultimate issue" in
the case.9"
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Wigmore dismisses rather summarily the notion that opinion evi-
dence should be inadmissible if it is not stated with sufficient certainty
87. Id. at 423-24, 246 N.E.2d at 53.
88. See generally Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends, and a Note of
Caution, 41 DENVER L. CENT. J. 226 (1964), on the decline of the rule.
89. See 7 WIGMORE §§ 1920-21; Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 423 (1952).
But cf. McCoid, Opinion Evidence and Expert Witnesses, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 356, 366 (1955).
90. King and Pillinger see the common-knowledge rule as the product of a pioneer country
culture, "independent, self-sufficient, and ruggedly equalitarian. . . . [s]uspicious and intoler-
ant to the unknown expert in any field that touches its own experience." KING & PILLINGER
40-41.
91. See, e.g., PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 702; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 13.
92. See Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1086 (1966).
Compare KING & PILLINGER 43-46, with Morgan, Book Review, 29 VA. L. REV. 970 (1943).
1974]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Wayne L. Rev. 797 1973-1974
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
that it can survive a motion for directed verdict or support a judg-
ment:
It should be added that Courts sometimes misapply the Opinion
rule to enforce the doctrine of Torts that a recovery for future
personal injuries must include only the certain or fairly probable, but
not the merely possible, consequences; so that the judge instead of
covering the subject by an instruction to the jury as to the measure
of recovery, excludes from evidence a physician's opinion expressed
in terms of possibility only. This attempt to control the course of
expert testimony is of course unreasonable in itself.9 3
Others have not considered the truth of the proposition so self-
evident. One notable critique of the Wigmore view starts from the
proposition that the burden is upon the party claiming injury to show
a compensable injury; then, "considering the sympathetic attitude of
juries toward plaintiffs generally, when opposed by large corpora-
tions in general and insurance companies in particular, as well as the
complexity of the medical features," one is led to the conclusion that
experts should base their opinion on the same certainty as the plain-
tiff is required to prove. 4 This is because "[i]n most cases of future
injury this expression of opinion is the only evidence as to the occur-
rence of the injury which the jury has to assist them. The danger that
they will accept the ominous, though remote, prophecies of the plain-
tiff's experts as sufficient is too great to justify such inconclusive
testimony."95
The argument just outlined correctly recognizes that a major
function of admissibility rules is some form of jury control. 6 In other
words, rules governing the admissibility of evidence serve not only to
expedite the fact-finding process, but also to restrict the opportunities
of the lay jury to exceed the legal bounds within which it is supposed
to operate. The-argument contrary to the Wigmore position assumes
that "possibility" evidence constitutes an irresistable temptation to
exceed those bounds.
Although not supported in the treatise, Wigmore's conclusion
seems to be the more persuasive. The contrary argument depends
upon an unsubstantiated assumption that juries are sympathetic to-
93. 7 WIGMORE § 1976, at 122.
94. E. STASON, S. ESTEP & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 477 (1959) [hereinafter
STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE].
95. Id.
96. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.12 (1965).
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ward injured plaintiffs. However, even if the common belief in the
truth of that assumption is correct,97 other factors ought to be consid-
ered. Principally, it should be noted that controlling the admissibility
of evidence is not the only way to ensure that juries do not improperly
award damages for injuries not sufficiently proved. This is a function
also of the trial courts' power to grant directed verdicts, judgments
n.o.v., and new trials, and the appellate courts' power to review the
sufficiency of evidence.98 It has been suggested that even assuming the
courts use these devices to prevent the jury from finding injury upon
the bare assertion that it is possible, admission of the opinion in the
first place is a waste of time.99 This argument neglects consideration
of the respective trial contexts in which admissiblity and sufficiency
decisions are made. In the usual practice, if a rule of certainty is being
applied to admissibility, evidence will be excluded when the expert
gives a negative answer to the question, "Do you have an opinion
[with the requisite certainty] as to whether. . ?" One deficiency in
this practice is that the opinion will be excluded when, as may be
rather frequent, the expert and the court do not mean the same thing
by "probable" or "reasonably certain" or whatever the standard
might be.' Making certainty an admissibility requirement also ig-
nores the fact that very little evidence taken as it comes in is sufficient
by itself; it is only by the accumulation of various bits, each in re-
sponse to a separate question,"°' that a party builds a sufficient case.
Thus, exclusion of an opinion on the basis of a negative response to
one question also means the exclusion of explanatory testimony by
the expert which would go to make the opinion sufficient evidence.
Even if the expert's testimony would not be sufficient, there may be
other evidence introduced to make the party's case, but conscien-
tiously applying an admissibility rule of certainty would exclude the
helpful opinion just because the expert is unable to preface his opinion
in conformity to the standard. On the other hand, these problems
may be avoided if the jury-control mechanism is applied after all the
evidence is in. By that time it is apparent whether the expert's opinion
is sufficiently certain, regardless of how he interprets the words of the
standard, and it is clear whether the expert can explain his opinion
97. But see Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065, 1072 (1964).
98. See JAMES, supra note 96, at §§ 7.13, .20, .22.
99. STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE 477.
100. See text at notes 118-23 infra.
101. Cf. MCCORMICK § 5.
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in such a way as to establish his party's case. By that time, then, the
court can rationally, not just speculatively, decide whether the evi-
dence, viewed as a whole, would justify the party in prevailing.
In spite of the superiority of applying the certainty test after the
evidence is in, there appear to be several explanations for continuing
to apply it as a prerequisite for admission of evidence. First, the
appellate -courts may not recognize the significance of applying a
jury-control device at one time in the proceeding as opposed to an-
other. This confusion about the issue presented is apparent in the
large number of decisions in which review of an admissibility question
is done only in sufficiency terms.102 In other cases, the court may
carefully denominate the issue as admissibility, but then make a deci-
sion which is not rationally explainable as an admissibility decision.
For example, a court may say that it has concluded after a review of
the expert's whole testimony that he did not indicate the requisite
certainty, that the testimony was therefore "inadmissible," and that
a motion to strike it should have been sustained.103 In the context of
that case, the decision really is not on admissibility but on sufficiency,
since it is based on a review of the evidence as a whole. Because of
the standard applied and the language used in stating the issue, how-
ever, there is a good possibility that a trial court deciding whether to
admit an opinion will not look to the whole of the expert's evidence
but only to the prefatory statement of confidence he is willing to give.
That suggests a second explanation for making certainty an admissi-
bility question: deciding whether an expert has used the proper"magic words" before admitting his opinion is much easier than
having to weigh all of the evidence. Thus, there is a natural tendency
to prefer asking for a "'yes" or "no" answer to the question of
102. See, e.g., Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 153 Ohio St. 429, 432, 92 N.E.2d
1, 2-3 (1950); Galveston, H & S.A. Ry. v. Powers, 101 Tex. 161, 164, 105 S.W. 491,492 (1907);
Pygman v. Helton, 148 W. Va. 281, 286-87, 134 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1964). In Pygman, the court
said:
Medical testimony to be admissible and sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury of
the proximate cause of an injury is not required to be based upon a reasonable cer-
tainty that the injury resulted from the negligence of the defendant. All that is required
to render such testimony admissible and sufficient to carry it to the jury is that it
should be of such a character as would warrant a reasonable inference by the jury that
the injury in question was caused by the negligent act or conduct of the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added). "
103. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Bacon, 89 N.H. 383, 392, 200 A. 399, 405 (1938); Lorch v. Eglin,
369 Pa. 314, 319-21, 85 A.2d 841, 843-44 (1952); Michalski v. Wagner, 9 Wis. 2d 22, 27-28,
100 N.W.2d 354, 357-58 (1960).
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whether he has an opinion with the requisite certainty over deciding
whether all the evidence provides a basis for finding with that
certainty that the asserted fact exists or will exist. As courts have
increasingly noted, however, reliance on such semantic formulas may
deprive a party of good evidence and will poorly serve the ends of
justice.'04
Another explanation of applying the rule of certainty to the ad-
mission of evidence is that the jury-control function may be less
blatant than if applied at the close of the evidence. In other words,
the courts may feel more comfortable depriving the jury of the evi-
dence in the first place than removing the case from the jury or even
overriding its decision. Although, as is noted above, the same func-
tion is served whenever the court takes such action, a concern not to
invade too obviously the jury's historic role as fact-finder may dictate
the timing.
A final explanation for the apparent choice of admissibility over
sufficiency as the occasion to apply the rule of certainty is that many
courts really have not made a conscious choice at all, in the sense of
considering the alternatives and selecting the most desirable. This is
apparent in the phenomenon, noted above, in which sufficiency rules
are applied to admissibility questions without consideration being
given to the possibility of distinction." 5 This explanation is also illus-
trated by the cases where the standard of admissibility is set at the
proponent's burden of persuasion and then the party without the
burden of persuasion is held to the same standard. The court shows
it has not given any real analysis to the problem when it says the
plaintiff's witness must state his opinion "to a reasonable certainty"
because otherwise the plaintiff has no sufficient evidence supporting
his case, and then says the defendant's evidence must also be stated
"to a reasonable certainty."" 6 If the court were consistently applying
its rationale, it would realize that the defendant need only persuade
the trier that the plaintiff's future injury, for example, is not a reason-
104. See, e.g., Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261, 1268 (8th Cir. 1970); Cordiner v.
Los Angeles Traction Co., 5 Cal. App. 400, 402, 91 P. 436, 437 (1907); Dzurik v. Tamura, 44
Hawaii 327, 330, 359 P.2d 164, 165-66 (1960); Rowe v. Maule Drug Co., 196 Kan. 489, 494-
95, 413 P.2d 104, 109 (1966); Rogers v. Sullivan, 410 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Ky. 1967); Moore v.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 4 Utah 2d 255, 258-59, 292 P.2d 849, 851 (1956).
105. See note 102 supra.
106. See Turner Constr. Co. v. Garrett, 310 S.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Ky. 1958); cf. Smail v.
Flock, 407 Pa. 148, 152, 180 A.2d 59, 61 (1962); Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 24, 46 A.2d
469, 472 (1946).
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able certainty and that this can be done with evidence of another
effect which is "probable" or maybe even "possible."' 1°7
C. A voiding Speculation
The other major theory behind the rule of certainty is that it
ensures that the opinion evidence will be probative of a material fact
and not just speculative. Thus, several courts have ruled that medical
opinion is speculative and of no aid to the trier of fact if it does not
satisfy an established standard of certainty.0 8 However, judicial es-
tablishment of those standards is open to several criticisms. First,
setting different standards of certainty for different issues, as in New
York, '9 just does not make logical sense if the concern is to avoid
speculation. The degree of uncertainty which constitutes speculation
does not vary between causation and prognosis: a one-in-three chance
that the plaintiff's head injury was caused by the defendant's negli-
gence is no more and no less certain than a one-in-three chance that
the head injury will be followed by epilepsy.10 Of course, it may be
in the nature of things that an expert can more frequently give the
former than the latter opinion; but if one is an expert and is willing
to state equal confidence in his opinions, then a court concerned with
the probabilities in a scientific sense ought to treat the opinions
equally. That some courts do not do so may be explained in a couple
of ways. On the one hand, the decisions reflect a judicial view of 80
or so years ago regarding the limitations of medical science. This is
apparent in the Griswold distinction between presently ascertainable
and latent future injuries:
In the former case that disease or injury and its symptoms are present
and existing, their indications are more or less plain and obvious, and
from their severity or slightness a recovery may reasonably be ex-
pected, or the contrary; while an opinion that some new and different
complication will arise is merely a double speculation ... .
The assumption made in applying a lower standard to presently
107. Cf. Byrd v. Lord Bros. Contractors, Inc., 256 Ore. 421, 425-26, 473 P.2d 1018, 1020
(1970). But see Conrad, The Expert and Legal Certainty, 9 J. FOR. Sci. 445, 452 (1964).
108. See, e.g., Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970); Turner Constr. Co. v.
Garrett, 310 S.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Ky. 1958).
109. See text at notes 27-45 supra.
110. See Weinberg, supra note 26, at 41.
I II. 115 N.Y. at 64, 21 N.E. at 726.
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ascertainable consequences-that "their indications are more . . .
plain and obvious"-fails to consider that the probabilities of some
latent consequences may be well established empirically. 1 2
The other explanation of multiple standards of certainty is unre-
lated to the underlying theory of avoiding speculation: it is an unarti-
culated, and perhaps unconscious, implementation of other substan-
tive tort law policies. For example, applying the least rigorous re-
quirement to causation opinions in New York may well be a function
of the necessity to prove injury in establishing a prima facie case in
negligence or workmen's compensation. Increasing the standard of
certainty above "possibility" would mean that more ascertainably
injured plaintiffs would be barred from recovery." 3 On the other
hand, evidence of change in, permanence of, or recovery from a
present injury affects only the measure of damages and is not essen-
tial to the plaintiff's cause of action, so the higher "probability"
standard is applied. The highest "reasonable certainty" standard for
latent consequences may be explained as a result of the distrust
(based on the medical knowledge of the day) of the certainty with
which predictions can be made, applied in furtherance of the rule that
future damages must be reasonably certain to be recoverable. "4
Regardless of the motivation for the adoption of different stan-
dards, it is clear that the scheme has substantive effects. In New
York, for example, the plaintiff who suffers an injury fully observable
at trial faces a less rigorous burden in introducing his evidence, and
is thereby necessarily better off in recovering compensation, than one
who has suffered an injury involving latent consequences. Thus, one
negligently exposed to radiation who exhibits ulcers and tumors can
get his case to the jury on expert testimony that the radiation "possi-
bly" caused the diseases and that the diseases "probably" will be-
come disabling. However, another exposed to the same radiation may
not be so fortunate. He can offer evidence that irradiation leads to
shortened life span, genetic damage, and leukemia, 5 inter alia, but
112. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Transit, Inc. v. Shomo, 127 Ind. App. 542, 553, 143 N.E.2d
431,437 (1957); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 370-71,431 P.2d 794,796 (1967).
113. A desire not to penalize injured plaintiffs for the inability of their expert medical
witnesses to testify with certainty is expressed in Brett v. J.M. Carras, Inc., 203 F.2d 451, 453-
54 (3d Cir. 1953) (sufficiency case, but quoting 2 WIGNORE, supra note 1, at § 663 on admissi-
bility); Tubbs v. Angerami, 20 App. Div. 2d 838, 839,247 N.Y.S.2d 881, 882 (1964) (sufficiency
case); see J. TRACY, THE DOCTOR AS A WITNESS 66-67 (2d ed. W. Curran 1965).
114. See Strohm v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 96 N.Y. 305, 306 (1884).
115. See, e.g., STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE 496-505; Humphrey, Radiation Injury: A Techni-
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no competent expert will say that any such injury is "reasonably
certain" to happen to this plaintiff,' so he will be out of court in the
absence of present injuries.'
The other, and more serious, problem with using a rule of cer-
tainty to exclude speculative opinions applies regardless of whether
the jurisdiction has multiple standards. That problem is one of com-
munication between the court and the expert in applying the verbal
standards of the rule. Making the decision whether to admit an-ex-
pert's testimony depend on his answer to a question like, "Do you
have an opinion based upon a reasonable medical certainty . . .
or "Can you tell us whether it is probable that . . . ?" requires that
there be a consensus in the courtroom as to the meaning of "cer-
tainty" or "probable." Yet the differences in background and orien-
tation between those trained in the law and those trained in the
sciences-to say nothing of the lay jurors! -guarantees that there
will be no consensus in most cases. The medical doctor's training
seeks isolation of single and certain bits of scientific exactitude. In
his vocabulary, "cause" is the single immediate antecedent, which
can be only a strength or weakness of an organism and not the doings
of other men."' With this orientation, a factor other than the immedi-
ate antecedent can at most be a "possible or probable influence"; a
prognostication always lacks scientific exactitude."' The legal orien-
tation, on the other hand, is to interpret in specific instances all of
the social policy concerns which go into making up The Law.' This
means that the lawyer's aspiration can only be approximation and not
exactitude. In a negligence case, he does not ask whether the defen-
cal and Legal Survey, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 171, 176-79 (1957).
116. See Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low-Level
Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. REV. 531, 537-40 (1971); cf. 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 812, 815
(1957).
117. For discussions of the difficulties imposed in such cases by statutes of limitations and
restrictions on the types of damages recoverable see STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE 199-309, 507-
13; Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitation Inadequacies in Tort Cases,
62 MICH. L. REV. 753 (1964); Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MICH.
L. REV. 479, 494-95 (1973).
118. Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of
Causation, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 630, 649-51 (1953); see, e.g., Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, Inc.,
12 N.Y.2d 414, 416, 190 N.E.2d 528, 529, 240 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (1963); TRACY, supra note
113, at 66; Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battleground, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 209,
216 (1957).
119. See Small, supra note 118, at 650.
120. Id. 653.
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dant was the sole or even the principal cause of the plaintiff's misfor-
tune, but only whether the defendant's part was of sufficient propor-
tion to make it just for him to shoulder the cost.' The difficulty in
the present situation arises because neither side seems to realize the
difference in orientation and its effects on the language being used.
The doctor, who is oriented to scientific certainty, cannot understand
why he is not permitted to testify to "possibilities," when those possi-
bilities would constitute a sufficient basis for him to take action in
his daily practice.12 The lawyer (and judge), however, wants to be
more certain of the facts before he takes action, because he knows
the uncertainties and ambiguities of the justice he seeks to achieve.
Thus, to him a "possibility" may not be a sufficient basis to act. If
it turns out, then, that the doctor means a likelihood substantially
greater when he says "possibility" than the lawyer does when he says
it, injustice could well result from application of a strict standard of
certainty. For example, suppose there is a 60 percent likelihood that
the plaintiff's injury A will lead to complication B. The doctor will
have to respond negatively when asked if he can say with reasonable
medical certainty that the plaintiff will develop B, since in his orienta-
tion it is only possible that B will occur. However, if the court knew
of the 60 percent likelihood it could grant the plaintiff relief, assum-
ing the "reasonable certainty" required to prove future damages
means "more likely than not."' 2 1
121. Id. 654; see O'Toole, Radiation, Causation, and Compensation, 54 GEo. L.J. 751, 773
(1966); cf. Korn, supra note 92, at 1093-95.
122. See Halpern, Legal Relation of Trauma to Cancer, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 208, 213-
14 (1963); Markus, Semantics of Traumatic Causation, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 233, 242-44
(1963); cf. American Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 216 Ark. 44, 46, 223 S.W.2d 1019, 1020 (1949).
Markus suggests that since the physician acts on the basis of "possibilities," "probable" is not
in his working vocabulary and if he would use it, it would be in the sense of "near certainty,"
rather than "51% likelihood." Markus, supra, at 243.
123. See, e.g., Bauman v. City & County of San Francisco, 42 Cal. App. 2d 144, 163-65,
108 P.2d 989, 1000 (1940), quoting Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 5 Cal. App. 400,
403, 91 P. 436, 437 (1907) ("Testimony of duly qualified experts which shows that in a majority
of cases. . .such injury results in future epilepsy. . .tends to prove the reasonable certainty
that such consequences will follow in any given case of like injury."); Rogers v. Sullivan, 410
S.W.2d 624, 628 (Ky. 1967); L'Esperance v. Sherburne, 85 N.H. 103, 110-14, 155 A. 203, 207-
09 (1931). But see, e.g., State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shain, 350 Mo. 316, 322-
23, 165 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1942).
The illustration in text, although theoretically accurate, may well be misleading. In practice
the courts are seldom comfortable with purely statistical evidence, or even with evidence in
which the probabilities are quantified. See, e.g., Cole v. Simpson, 299 Mich. 589, 594-95, 1
N.W.2d 2, 4 (1941) (testimony of 80 percent possibility that injuries could have been caused
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Rational application of a rule of certainty in admitting opinions
presumes not only that there is fundamental agreement on the terms
being used but also that the expert is accurately articulating his own
level of confidence in the opinion he expresses. A number of factors
suggest that this may not always be the case. First, the expert's
statement of his certainty involves a process of abstraction; i.e., he is
distilling into the word "possible" or "probable" or whatever a whole
complex of facts, including his observations in the present case, his
training and experience, and his intuition.124 Given the important but
unstated factors which may disappear from view in this abstraction,
it simply does not make sense to judge an expert's opinion on whether
he will characterize its certainty according to a particular verbal
formula. As one commentator has noted, the courts often err when
they treat the expert as if he "has made a specific quantitative deter-
mination and has expressed it in precise fashion to reflect that
thought. '" ' '25 In many cases the expert may honestly be unsure how
certain his opinion is or how to express his level of uncertainty, yet
he may be forced into choosing between "probable" or "not proba-
ble," "reasonably certain" or "not reasonably certain." Such a
choice both imposes an unwarranted precision on the testimony and
works to exclude testimony which might well satisfy the standard if
the margin for error in the approximation is taken into account . 26
by fall had "very little probative value"); Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965) (testimony of 90 percent chance that accident caused hernia held not substantial
evidence); Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in THE HAYDEN COLLO-
QUIUM ON SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT AND METHOD 54-55 (D. Lerner ed. 1958); MCCORMICK, supra
note I, § 204, at 494 n.49. Cole v. Simpson, supra, might be explained on the basis that the
witness was expressing only 80 percent confidence in an opinion of "could," to be distinguished
from an 80 percent chance of "did." If so, it is only one example of a frequent failure in this
area to specify whether a stated standard of certainty applies to the witness' confidence in his
opinion or to the probability of occurrence of the fact in issue, or whether those two are to be
distinguished.
124. See S. CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF WORDS chs. 6-7 (1938); W. JOHNSON, PEOPLE IN
QUANDARIES ch. 7 (1946); A. KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY chs. 24-26 (1933); I. LEE,
LANGUAGE HABITS IN HUMAN AFFAIRS ch. 4 (1940); C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING
OF MEANING ch. I (8th ed. 1948). This process applies to any verbalization, and therefore to
any verbal standard, no matter how relaxed.
125. See Markus, supra note 122, at 240.
126. For example, if the court excludes all statements of less than 51 percent probability,
and the expert can only say the probabilities are in the 40-60 percent range, then the opinion
will be excluded because the maximum opinion in which the expert can be wholly confident
(40 percent) does not meet the 51 percent standard. However, if the "two-valued orientation"
were not imposed, the expert would be able to explain the range of probabilities, the upper half
of which (51-60 percent), at least, would satisfy the standard. See Markus, supra note 122, at
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The manner in which the attorney prepares the expert before trial
may also contribute to misleading statements of certainty. For exam-
ple, the attorney might attempt to reassure his medical witness with
the assertion that all the degrees of certainty and probability are just
legal terms for the medical evaluation which the doctor would express
to his patient.'27 As a result, the expert may use terms which will
make his opinions admissible without realizing the significance the
court places on distinctive levels of certainty. At the least, this means
helpful information will be lost by the abstraction into the legal term;
at worst, it may mean that evidence is improperly admitted or ex-
cluded because the witness does not know the legal significance of the
term he uses.
A final respect in which rules of certainty involve communication
problems which keep them from succeeding in consistently excluding
speculative testimony is that the expert may increase his stated level
of certainty out of fear that his opinion may otherwise be excluded.
This is certainly not always a conscious matter, although the rule is
subject to that abuse;' s a treating physician may well so identify with
his patient that he subconsciously skews his testimony.
The problems which have just been discussed are most serious
when the court follows what might be called a "magic words" ap-
proach in applying the rule of certainty, i.e., the court admits or
excludes on the basis of whether the expert says or is willing to agree
to a specific form of words. This approach is virtually the only one
available if the court sees the rule as one strictly of admissibility, and
will exclude any opinion if there is not a positive answer to the prelim-
inary question regarding the certainty of the opinion. However, the
cases increasingly indicate that the form of the answer is not so
important as the totality of its content. 9 If the same standards are
retained, this means that the burden of characterizing the certainty
of the opinion is shifted from the witness to the trial judge. Even with
that shift, the same problems of communication arise. The witness is
241; cf. STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE 457-58 (two-valued orientation causes courts to ignore
statistical basis of most decisions).
127. See M. Hours, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROOF § 28.02(4) (1966); Halpern,
supra note 122, at 214; Kennett, Preparation and Trial of a Medical Malpractice Case, 6 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 87, 92 (1957).
128. See Note, supra note 26, at 154-55.
129. See, e.g., Schnear v. Boldrey, 22 Cal. App. 3d 478,484, 99 Cal. Rptr. 404,408 (1971);
Williams v. Daniels, 48 Tenn. App. 112, 124-25, 344 S.W.2d 555, 560 (1960); Otis Elevator
Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 331 (Tex. 1968).
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still trying to communicate an opinion about which he may be uncer-
tain, based upon both articulated and unarticulated factors, regarding
an imprecise science, in terms helpful to a jury rather than in those
he ordinarily uses. Except in cases where there is clearly no basis for
the expert's opinion, the court (presumably conversant only in legal
and not scientific language) is in no better position than the lay jury
to judge the level of the expert's certainty. To expect the court to be
consistent in neatly categorizing scientific opinions is to expect the
impossible.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Abolishing the Rule of Certainty
The foregoing analysis indicates that the rule of certainty is defec-
tive when measured against any of its suggested theoretical bases;
either the basis itself or its application through this admissibility rule
is in all cases unsatisfactory. Therefore, the following rule is proposed
for adoption in evidence codifications:
Testimony in the form of opinion or inference otherwise admissi-
ble is not objectionable because the expert does not indicate any
particular degree of certainty regarding the opinion or inference.
In the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, such a rule would appro-
priately constitute a second paragraph of rule 704,131 since its pur-
poses are also to render fully effective the approach of the Rules in
both admitting opinions when they are helpful to the trier of fact and
allaying any doubt regarding the rule of certainty applicable in fed-
eral courts. 31
The proposed rule would not require the courts to receive every
expert opinion tendered. Under federal rule 702, expert testimony
must assist the trier of fact;132 rules 401 and 403 require that evidence
be relevant and not time-wasting; 33 and rule 705 provides that an
130. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
131. See PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 704, Advisory Comm. Note at 96.
132. PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
133. PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 401 provides:
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expert witness may be required to disclose the facts underlying his
opinion. 13 An opinion which is truly speculative in the sense that it
has no basis, should be excluded on any or all of those grounds,
because it cannot assist the trier, it is not relevant and wastes time,
and it cannot be supported by facts. These other rules are thus ade-
quate to serve the certainty rule's purpose of avoiding speculation, yet
they do not involve the rule's communication problems or the unnec-
essary exclusion of evidence.
The proposed rule also has no effect on the court's power to
ensure proper verdicts by giving instructions and taking an insuffi-
cient case from the jury. Thus, the court may still instruct the jury
to consider the evidence in light of the confidence with which they
believe it was given and, further, to decide the case according to the
facts whose certainty they find to the degree required by law. 13
Moreover, there is no change in the court's power to control the jury's
functioning by means of its rulings on motions for directed verdict,
judgment n.o.v., or new trial.
The proposed rule explicitly prohibits relying on verbal formulas
in admitting opinion testimony. The prohibition is a recognition of
both the semantic problems discussed above'36 and the "multi-
based" 3 nature of such testimony. The court cannot rationally ap-
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
134. PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or
data on cross-examination.
On the distinction made in rule 705 between "reasons" and "underlying facts" see P.
ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 83 (1973); cf. Tarlow
v. Metropolitan Ski Slopes, Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 410, 414, 271 N.E.2d 515, 516-517, 322 N.Y.S.2d
665, 667-68 (1971), construing N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4515 (1963); People v. Crossland, 9 N.Y.2d
464, 466-67, 174 N.E.2d 604, 605-06, 214 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730-31 (1961).
135. But cf. Ernshaw v. Roberge, 86 N.H. 451,454, 170 A. 7, 8 (1934) (erroneous admission
of "possibility" testimony not cured by proper instruction on "probability" burden of persua-
sion); Haase v. Ryan, 100 Ohio App. 285, 289-90, 132 N.E.2d 406, 409-10 (1955) (same).
136. See text at notes 118-29 supra.
137. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473, 474 passim
(1962).
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praise an opinion without being told of the numerous factors consid-
ered in reaching it. The proposed rule means that if the proponent
does not elicit mention of those factors, his opponent must demon-
strate their absence through cross-examination if he wishes to exclude
the opinion as without foundation. This is not an unreasonable bur-
den to place upon the opponent, especially since under the federal
civil procedure rules'38 he is entitled to discover before trial the
substance of the expert's opinion and a summary of its supporting
grounds.139 Even where such discovery is not permitted, the proposed
rule does not require the cross-examiner to elicit facts unfavorable to
his cause; he has the option of letting the opinion sink into the limbo
of unsupported and uncross-examined (and therefore unemphasized)
testimony. In any case, the judge and jury will be making their respec-
tive decisions on the basis of facts brought out (or not) by the parties,
rather than on the particular form of words used by the witness.
The proposed rule would be an improvement over the present rule
of certainty in several other respects. First, and of the most practical
importance, it should promote precision and veracity on the part of
the expert witness. No longer should there be even unconscious pres-
sures to overstate the certainty of testimony to ensure its admission.
In addition, the new procedure should encourage fuller development
by both parties of the important underlying basis for the opinion.
Thus, in both these ways a principal goal of evidence law, to provide
the trier of fact with relevant and reliable evidence, will be fur-
thered. " "
Second, the proposed rule is advantageous in that it will put the
legal system more in line with the world within which it operates.
Specifically, it repudiates a rule mistrustful of the jury and of medical
science. The rule of certainty is mistrustful of the jury in that it totally
removes from their consideration evidence insufficient in itself to
prove an issue, on the assumption that they will speculate rather than
follow the court's instructions, if given a chance. "' The rule, as ap-
plied in some jurisdictions, is also mistrustful of-or at least ignorant
of-medical science, to the extent that it imposes more significant
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
139. See PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 705, Advisory Comm. Note at 97-98; Powell & Burns,
A Discussion of the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 GONZAGA L. REV. 1, 18 (1972).
140. See generally Grismofte v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646
(1942); 28 IOWA L. REV. 549, 553 (1943).
141. See Weinberg, supra note 26, at 43.
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burdens on opinions of prognosis than causation. However justified
these attitudes might once have been, they are not so now. Therefore,
the proposed rule applies the same standard of relevancy and helpful-
ness to all opinions, and by placing its faith in modern, better-
educated jurors, it reaffirms the basic fact-finding function of the
jury. 4 2
Finally, on a theoretical level the new rule is an improvement in
promoting clearer legal reasoning by separating the various issues
involved with expert testimony. It should make clear that admissibil-
ity in this context is principally a question of relevance and reliability,
that sufficiency is a separate question with considerations of both jury
control and substantive law, and that burden of proof is also a sepa-
rate matter, determined on the basis of substantive policy. One possi-
ble result from adoption of the proposal is that there should no longer
be a need for what appear to be changes in substantive law to circum-
vent an evidence rule. Under the rule of certainty, evidence of "possi-
ble" future consequences has sometimes been admitted on the ground
that the opinion tends to prove "certain" susceptibility or compensa-
ble anxiety.' Such a ruling appears to expand the definition of
compensable injury just to get around an evidentiary rule which is too
strict in the circumstances. The proposed rule avoids that situation
by removal of the strict admissibility rule, thus forcing the compensa-
ble injury question to be faced on its own terms and decided on
extrinsic policy grounds, rather than in response to the evidentiary
setting of the case. However, in one respect, the new rule may have
its own substantive effects. If (contrary to the premises on which the
change is made) juries are permitted to award compensation for less
than reasonably certain future consequences, with damages reduced
by the improbability of their being incurred, there will be a substan-
tial change in the present "all or nothing" tort damages principle.' 4
It might not be a bad idea that a plaintiff with a 20 percent chance
of developing epilepsy from his head injury should receive 20 percent
142. See Forkosch, The Nature of Legal Evidence, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1356, 1381-82 (1971).
143. See, e.g., Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1970); Zell v.
Umphrey, 250 Ala. 107, 109, 34 So. 2d 472, 473 (1948); cf. Leenders v. California Hawaiian
Sugar Ref. Corp., 59 Cal. App. 2d 752, 759-60, 139 P.2d 987, 991 (1943); Holecek v. Janke,
171 N.W.2d 94, 101 (N.D. 1969); Teegarden v. Dahl, 138 N.W.2d 668, 684 (N.D. 1965).
144. See generally STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE 477-78, 507-16, for a discussion of the "all-
or-nothing" principle and recommendations designed to solve the difficult problems it poses in
nuclear irradiation cases.
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of the potential costs to him of such a disease;"' the only way to
ensure that that question is answered directly on the merits and not
through the back door is for the courts to be diligent in removing
issues from the jury when the evidence is insufficient.
B. The Erie Problem
1. Erie Standards for a Federal Evidence Rule
The implication of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"' was that
unless an explicit federal statutory or constitutional provision gov-
erned, federal courts must apply state substantive law but could use
their own procedure.4 7 Therefore, if the proposed rule regarding cer-
tainty is to be effective in diversity cases (where the question is likely
to arise), it must be shown to be procedural. The currently applicable
Erie tests were set out in Hanna v. Plumer:4 8 if the matter is not
covered by a rule adopted under the Rules Enabling Act,' the state
provision must be followed if failure to do so would lead to forum-
shopping and inequitable administration of the laws between resi-
dents and nonresidents of the forum state.' If, however, the matter
is covered by a rule adopted under the Enabling Act, the federal rule
applies unless it exceeds the bounds of the Act."' In determining
whether a rule is substantive or procedural in terms of the Enabling
Act, the Court reaffirmed the test enunciated in Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co.:152 "The test must be whether a rule really regulates proce-
dure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them.' 5 3
145. See id.; Weinberg, supra note 26, at 44.
146. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
147. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
148. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
150. 380 U.S. at 466-69.
151. Id. 469-74. The rationale for the Hanna test is that
the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary
and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the
practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and proce-
dure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Id. 472.
152. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
153. Id. 14.
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Even if the rulemaking power thus extends to all matters "ration-
ally capable of classification" as procedure,'-" Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Hanna pointed out that the power should not
be exercised without due regard for the basic policies of federalism
which underlie the Erie doctrine. Specifically, he was concerned with
the constitutional scheme which "envisions an allocation of law-
making functions between state and federal legislative processes
which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law
affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative
powers in this regard." '55 To his mind, the proper approach in deter-
mining whether to apply a state or federal rule is not to determine
whether it is "substantive" or "procedural" under Sibbach or any
other test, but
to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule
would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. If
so, Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule prevail, even
in the face of a conflicting federal rule.'
Judge Weinstein has suggested that if rulemakers are going to
consider the policies of federalism involved, in addition to the broad
grant of power inferable from Hanna, it is helpful to divide evidence
rules into three classes.1 57 The first class, which includes the majority
of traditional evidence rules, such as hearsay, authentication, and
best evidence, is comprised of those which are "designed for all kinds
of litigation and intended to achieve a more effective and truthful
result."' 5 They are a proper subject of uniform federal treatment,
since varying state and federal rules reflect nothing more than differ-
ing views on how to accomplish that same result. 55 The second group,
154. 380 U.S. at 472.
155. Id. 474-75.
156. Id. 475, citing H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 378 (1953).
157. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 353, 357, 361 (1969). The article is an expanded version
of a memorandum submitted to the Advisory Committee. See Cl-ary, The Plan for the Adop-
tion of Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 142,
153 n. 17 (1970). The three-fold classification it sets out has been widely adopted by commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Korn, Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 48
F.R.D. 65, 73 (1969); Powell & Burns, supra note 139, at 5; Comment, Major Changes under
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 37 TENN. L. REV. 556, 578 (1970).
158. Weinstein, supra note 157, at 361.
159. Id.
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on the other hand, includes rules closely associated with particular
substantive rights.16 Because rules regarding matters like burdens of
proof and presumptions are designed to affect substantive rights by
favoring one side or the other in particular types of litigation, federal
courts should properly defer to the state rule. The third class includes
those rules (e.g., privileges) which are designed to protect policies
extrinsic to the issues being litigated.16" ' This group poses the most
difficult Erie problems for the rulemakers, but since it is not of
concern to the present discussion, no attempt will be made to suggest
the alternative approaches. 6 2
Weinstein includes rules governing expert and opinion testimony
in his first category.6 3 Various rules about the proper subjects of
expert testimony or the qualifications of experts, for example, may
160. Id. 363-64.
161. Id. 370.
162. Id. 370-73.
163. Id. 362; see Korn, supra note 157, at 73.
Very few federal cases involving the rule of certainty have directly considered any Erie
problems. In Neff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1948), affd, 173 F.2d 931
(3d Cir. 1949), the court held that the restrictive Pennsylvania rule of certainty did not apply
because the claim was based on substantive rights granted under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Instead, the court admitted "could have" testimony on the ground that the
governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), in general placed admissibility solely on the
bases of relevancy and materiality. 7 F.R.D. at 534. In Hill v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 174 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1949), a personal injury action, the court said it was irrelevant
whether the Pennsylvania rule was controlling, since even its restrictive standard was satisfied.
Id. 172-73; see Beezer v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 107 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Pa. 1952), affd per
curiam, 203 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1953). In the following cases the Erie issue was not raised, but
the state rule was explicitly followed regardless of the nature of the claim; it should be noted
that in all cases the evidence was admitted or the error was held not prejudicial: Norland v.
Washington Gen. Hosp., 461 F.2d 694, 697-98 (8th Cir. 1972) (medical malpractice); Trapp v.
4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1970) (personal injury, diversity); Sheptur v.
Procter & Gamble Distr. Co., 261 F.2d 221, 223 (6th Cir. 1958) (products liability, diversity);
Fort Worth & D. Ry. v. Janski, 223 F.2d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 1955) (FELA). The same is true
of the following cases in which the state rule was apparently followed: Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.
v. Melcher, 333 F.2d 996, 1000 (8th Cir. 1964) (FELA); American Motorists Ins. Co. v.
Landes, 252 F.2d 751, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1958) (workmen's compensation, diversity). In Woelfle
v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1939), involving a claim on a
life insurance double indemnity clause, the court cited only federal precedents in admitting the
opinion. The oft-cited Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959), in-
volved Jones Act and seaman's maintenance claims. In upholding the sufficiency of the evidence
presented, the Court said:
The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words by the physicians
in giving their testimony. The members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were
sworn to make a legal determination of the question of causation.
Id. at 109 (footnote omitted). No Erie issue was discussed.
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indicate different assessments of what evidence a jury needs or can
be trusted with, but they are all designed to reach the best possible
resolution of the litigation. It is true that the choice of one rule over
another may affect the outcome in some cases, but this effect is
unpredictable in the sense that it does not help or hurt an identifiable
class of litigants."4 This same characterization would also apply gen-
erally to a rule of certainty; Le., every plaintiff in the jurisdiction
seeking, for instance, to prove future consequences would be required
to present medical testimony "to a reasonable certainty" that the
consequences would appear.
2. The Rule of Certainty Used Substantively
Cases in at least two states, however, suggest that the rule of
certainty may be more than truth-determining; it may be one of those
in Weinstein's second class, a rule closely associated with particular
substantive rights. This inference of substantive content is made on
the basis that different standards of certainty are applied in different
types of cases. Maryland is the clearer example of this phenomenon.
On at least three occasions since 1946, the court of appeals has stated
that a medical expert in a workmen's compensation case may testify
regarding a cause "which produced, or probably produced, or might
have produced" a given condition." 5 The expert's opinion even of a
probability or possibility is admissible because it may aid the jury in
making reasonable inferences from the facts. 6 By contrast, in other
negligent personal injury cases the decisions have all indicated that
the test is "reasonable probability or reasonable certainty," and that
the expert witness "must base his opinion on probability and not on
mere possibility."'6 7 The difference between the rules is not explaina-
164. See Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563,
569-71 (1967).
165. Baughman Contracting Co. v. Mellott, 216 Md. 278, 283, 139 A.2d 852, 854 (1958);
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Bishop, 189 Md. 147, 156, 55 A.2d 507, 511 (1947)
(sufficiency case); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 379-
80, 50 A.2d 256, 259 (1946); accord, Yellow Cab Co. v. Bisasky, 11 Md. App. 491, 504-06,
275 A.2d 193, 201-02 (1971).
166. E.g., Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpernisse, 187 Md. 375, 379-
80, 50 A.2d 256, 259 (1946). The Scherpenisse opinion relies on Langenfelder v. Thompson,
179 Md. 502, 507, 20 A.2d 491, 493 (1941), noted in 136 A.L.R. 965 (1942), a negligence
decision in which the issue was whether a medical expert could testify without absolute certainty
because the matter was one on which there was a difference of expert opinion.
167. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cooper, 248 Md. 536, 543, 237 A.2d 753, 756 (1968);
19741
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ble in terms of different elements to be proved, since causation must
be established in both workmen's compensation and negligence
cases. 168 And while it is possible that whether the opinion is ultimately
admitted is a function of the presence or absence of other evidence
on the issue, 69 the two rules are stated consistently according to the
type of case. It thus appears that in Maryland different standards are
being applied to the same factual issue, depending solely on the sub-
stantive right being enforced. This fact would make the rule "substan-
tive," thereby binding the federal courts to follow the state rule-even
under Mr. Justice Harlan's approach of looking at the effect on
primary activity. 7 ° For example, a potential defendant subject to
workmen's compensation liability in Maryland must procure more
insurance than he would if proof of liability were at the higher "cer-
tainty or probability" standard applied to all other personal injury
actions. The additional exposure to liability imposed by the eviden-
tiary rule thus has a predictable effect on him as part of an identifia-
ble class of litigants.
Nebraska presents the weaker case for seeing a substantive aspect
to the rule of certainty. One line of authority begins with two early
negligence cases, one by a passenger against a streetcar company,' 7'
and the other by an employee against his employer for an industrial
accident. 7 2 In these cases, testimony that the plaintiff's injuries"could" or "might" have been caused by the accident was admitted
Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 203-04, 167 A.2d 96, 98-99 (1961); see Twom-
bley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476,488, 158 A.2d 110, 116(1960); Agerv. Baltimore Transit
Co., 213 Md. 414, 421, 132 A.2d 469, 473 (1957). But see Hughes v. Carter, 236 Md. 484, 487,
204 A.2d 566, 567-68 (1964) (suggesting distinction between "probability" sufficiency rule and"possibility" admissibility rule); Sun Cab Co. v. Carter, 14 Md. App. 395, 287 A.2d 73, 80-81
(1972) (same).
The same distinction between workmen's compensation and negligence cases appears to be
made regarding prognosis opinions. Compare Baughman Contracting Co. v. Mellott, 216 Md.
278, 282, 139 A.2d 852, 854 (1958) (workmen's compensation), with Kuiawa v. Baltimore
Transit Co., supra, and Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 44-45, 113 A.2d 82,
86 (1955) (negligence).
168. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODa art. 101, § 15 (Supp. 1972), construed in Montgomery
County v. Athey, 227 Md. 312, 314-15, 176 A.2d 766, 767 (1962); Cogswell v. Frazier, 183 Md.
654, 662-63, 39 A.2d 815, 818 (1942).
169. Compare Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375,
379-80, 50 A.2d 256, 259 (1946), with Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 203-04,
167 A.2d 96, 98-99 (1961).
170. See Hanna v. Plumer,,380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (concurring opinion).
171. Gugler v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 86 Neb. 586, 125 N.W. 1098 (1910).
172. Koran v. Cudahy Packing Co., 100 Neb. 693, 161 N.W. 245 (1916).
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over objection that it was conjectural or speculative. The court held
that while such testimony would be insufficient, it was up to the jury
to decide the case, and since other evidence was offered in each case
the defendant was not prejudiced. 173 This line of authority was con-
tinued in a 1943 action to recover double indemnity under a life
insurance policy. 74 The trial court overruled an objection, made on
the ground of speculation, to testimony that "I think he died from
coronary embolus, most likely derived from this discolored patch in
his arm or elbow. ' 17 The supreme court upheld admission of the
testimony, but, in spite of the objection made, the court held only that
the testimony was not objectionable for dealing with "ultimate
facts. ''17 Two recent cases suggesting the admissibility of less than"reasonable certainty" testimony involved workmen'scompensation
claims. 77 Although admissibility was not directly raised, the supreme
court used "could have caused" testimony in sustaining awards for
the claimants on de novo review of the cases. 7 1
The contrary authority in Nebraska is a recent decision in an
action for injuries suffered in a gas explosion.'7 ' Over repeated objec-
tions that he was not testifying with "reasonable medical certainty,"
the plaintiff's doctor stated, "I think it would be reasonable to say
that among the causes for these symptoms the possibility of exposure
to gas would have to be considered."'80 The supreme court said, "It
seems apparent that the objections should have been sustained and
the answer excluded."'' The fact that no decision other than those
mentioned, except some involving workmen's compensation
claims, 8 2 discusses this question, and the fact that the one decision
173. Id. at 698-99, 161 N.W. at 247; Gugler v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 86 Neb. 586, 589-
91, 125 N.W. 1098, 1101 (1910).
174. McNaught v. New York Life Ins. Co., 143 Neb. 213, 12 N.W.2d 108 (1943).
175. Id. at 216, 112 N.W.2d at 110 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 218-20, 112 N.W.2d at 111-13.
177. Brokaw v. Robinson, 183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461 (1969); Welke v. City of Ains-
worth, 179 Neb. 496, 138 N.W.2d 808 (1965).
178. See Brokaw v. Robinson, 183 Neb. 760, 762-63,765, 164 N.W.2d 461,464,465 (1969);
id. at 766-67, 164 N.W.2d at 465-66 (dissenting opinion); Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 179 Neb.
496, 503, 138 N.W.2d 808, 812-13 (1965).
179. Whittington v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 177 Neb. 264, 128 N.W.2d 795 (1964).
180. Id. at 286, 128 N.W.2d at 808. The evidence of the plaintiff's illness was offered as
circumstantial proof that there had been a gas leak.
181. Id.
182. E.g., Seymour v. Journal-Star Printing Co., 174 Neb. 150, 157, 116 N.W.2d 297, 302
(1962); Klentz v. Transamerican Freightlines, Inc., 173 Neb. 53, 58, 112 N.W.2d 405, 409
1974]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Wayne L. Rev. 817 1973-1974
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
requiring reasonable certainty gives neither authority nor reasoning
for its position, admittedly make Nebraska weak evidence for the
point developed here. Nevertheless, plaintiffs in common carrier, in-
dustrial accident, life insurance policy, and workmen's compensation
cases have frequently been the beneficiaries of assistance not granted
other tort litigants.8 3 Therefore, it is not unreasonable, assuming the
gas explosion case is not simply aberrational, to infer a substantive
purpose in the way Nebraska courts have applied the rule of cer-
tainty.
V. CONCLUSION
The above are the only instances found where even inferentially
is the rule of certainty used to promote substantive policies. In all
other jurisdictions the rule seems to be applied consistently to the
respective factual issues of causation and future consequences. Fur-
thermore, the nonsubstantive nature of the rule is apparent in the
numerous decisions which explain the rule's application in terms of"speculation," "sufficiency of evidence," and "ultimate issue." Re-
gardless of their analytical weaknesses in justifying the rule, those
terms express a judicial concern with the proper allocation of func-
tions between judge and jury. This is a concern which typifies ques-
tions properly resolved independently by independent court systems,
and which are therefore procedural for Erie purposes. 1' 4
The overwhelmingly procedural character of the rule of certainty
thus makes it proper, under both the power arguably granted in
Hanna to make rules for all matters rationally classifiable as proce-
dural and the discretion urged by Judge Weinstein to be used in
making such rules, to abolish the rule in the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence. The weaknesses of the present rule, especially as it ex-
cludes probative opinion evidence, make abolition desirable.
(1961); Schwabauer v. State, 147 Neb. 620, 624-25, 24 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1946). In all the
above-cited cases the issue was the sufficiency, not the admissibility, of the evidence.
183. E.g.. cf., Haler v. Gering Bean Co., 163 Neb. 748, 755-56, 81 N.W.2d 152, 154 (1957)
(workmen's compensation law to be liberally construed); Pruitt v. Lincoln City Lines, Inc., 147
Neb. 204, 209-10, 22 N.W.2d 651, 653 (1946) (common carrier must exercise "utmost skill,
diligence, and foresight consistent with the business" for passengers' safety); McNaught v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 143 Neb. 213, 218-19, 12 N.W.2d 108, 111 (1943) (presumption of acciden-
tal death in action on life insurance policy); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 533-37 (4th
ed. 1971) (non-statutory rules and practices developed to ease plight of injured workmen not
covered by workmen's compensation).
184. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Korn, supra
note 157, at 73.
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